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ABSTRACT
The article attempts to dissect the independence of anti-corruption agencies 
and the reasons for their operational successes and challenges. This brief 
examination of legislative and regulatory frameworks is important as a reflec-
tion of their impartiality and effectiveness. The case studies upon which the 
research is based, are the Special Investigatings Unit (SIU) in South Africa, 
and the Civil Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in India. In the process, their key 
functions, operations, financial independence and priorities are examined. 
The research undertaken is based on the qualitative, interpretative frame of 
reference that is based on the thorough study and analysis of primary and 
secondary documents and person to person interviews with nationally and 
internationally–based researchers and experts on the issues under investi-
gation. The analysis relies on a comparative examination of the agencies in 
terms of a number of issues of national and international importance as re-
lated to the fight against corruption. The comparison indicates that different 
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AbbREvIATIONS
●● ADB–OECD (Asian Development Bank–Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development)
●● CBI (Civil Bureau of Investigation)
●● DPCI (Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation)
●● HAWKS (Directorate of Priority Crime Investigation)
●● ICAC (Independent Commission against Corruption)
●● IIU (Internal Integrity Unit)
●● NPA (National Prosecuting Authority)
●● OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development)
●● SCORPIONS (Directorate of Special Operations)
●● SIU (Special Investigations Unit)
●● UNCAC (United Nations Convention against Corruption)
INTRODUCTION
To say that corruption in South Africa and India are a major problem and challenge 
will be an understatement. An international phenomenon of major proportion, both 
the South African and Indian versions are replete with diversity, different levels of 
deviance and greed, and a wide variety of anti-corruption legislative measures and 
agencies that have proven to be insufficient as mechanisms to decrease or stop this 
social and economic malaise. As one of the greatest challenges that the people of 
these countries and people throughout the world face, corruption has detrimental 
effects on the relentless efforts for democratic stability, societal sustainability, and 
economic growth and development. Key legislation and regulatory frameworks lay 
the foundations of the fight against corruption and independent anti-corruption 
agencies lead the fight. Amongst the key ingredients in their success, but not the only 
one, is their independence. The comparative study of two anti–corruption agencies 
in South Africa and India will attempt to shed light on problems and challenges 
facing them.
levels of independence exist, and that a number of issues and problems pres-
ent serious challenges in a successful fight against corruption.
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ON ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCIES’ INSTITUTIONAL 
INDEPENDENCE: THE FUNDAMENTALS
Anti-corruption agencies, as suggested by the OECD (2008:31), are generally grouped 
into three models: multi-purpose with law enforcement powers; law enforcement type 
(single-function); and preventative, policy development and co-ordination institu-
tions. In this regard, single-function agencies have investigative responsibilities, while 
multi-purpose agencies operate with two or more (usually all) of the full range of anti-
corruption functions identified by the OECD (2008:9), which include policy devel-
opment, research, monitoring and co-ordination; prevention of corruption in power 
structures; education and awareness raising; and investigation and prosecution. South 
Africa currently has several institutions mandated to investigate, and prosecute corrup-
tion. The most prominent of them being the Hawks, the Public Protector and the SIU 
(RSA, National Anti-Corruption Forum, 2005; Woods and Mantzaris 2012).
There is no doubt that over the years the South African and Indian governments has 
adopted a wide range of legal and statutory measures aimed at an intensification of 
efforts against corruption. Simultaneously, these governments have attempted to im-
prove the functionality of institutions charged with investigating and combating cor-
ruption. Within South Africa, these efforts emanate from the provisions provided in 
Section 181 of Chapter 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 
of 1996 (RSA, the Constitution, 1996b), which requires that institutions supporting 
constitutional democracy should be strengthened. This, in light of the argument by 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2014), seeks to protect the fundamentals 
of democracy, meaning that agencies charged with an anti-corruption mandate, or at 
least one of the key agencies, should be strengthened, through legislation, resourcing 
and/or budgetary support. This means that the intensification of anti-corruption efforts 
in South Africa, India and throughout the world almost certainly cannot be successful 
unless its anti-corruption agencies are independent from political influence.
There have been voices that have seriously questioned the independence or the 
lack thereof of key corruption-fighting agencies, including the Hawks, the Special 
Investigating Unit (SIU), the Public Protector, and the National Prosecuting Authority 
(Hartley 2012; Tamukamoyo 2013:12; Hawker 2015). It can be understood that such 
independence can only be guaranteed by the state’s political will, devoid of political 
interference which in most cases is the major contributor to lower levels of indepen-
dence within anti-corruption agencies (Tamukamoyo 2013:19). The key elements of 
an anti-corruption agency’s independence are organisational, i.e. the least possible 
political interference in appointment of authorities, implementation of functions and 
decision-making; functional meaning that there is no interference of third party/parties 
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or the executive; financial that refers to the impossibility of the government to impede 
or restrict the agency’s activities by reducing its budget and/or budget of other associ-
ated agencies (Institute of Supreme Audit Institutions – INTOSAI in Hussman, Hechler 
and Penailillo 2009:29). The above mean that the independence of anti-corruption 
agencies is synonymous to autonomy, and they should not be subject to the influence, 
control, action or jurisdiction of others in the execution of their work. This article will 
focus specifically on the independence and functionality of anti-corruption agencies 
within South Africa, and particularly for the SIU and its Indian counterparts.
THE RESEARCH METHODS
The case studies utilised the qualitative research approach, consisting of the study of 
primary and secondary sources, as well as semi-structured personal interviews with 
SIU managers as well as Indian researchers and academics in the field. The selection 
of the interviewees was based on a judgemental sampling frame as the participants 
had to have been knowledgeable and competent to provide specific detail of their on-
the-job and research experience relating to aims and objectives of the project.
In respect of the SIU members questions and the recording of responses did not 
contain personal details of the respondents in order to maintain anonymity and to 
ensure that they would be more open and amenable to providing objective responses. 
Participants were given the assurance of confidentiality in respect of their responses. 
In many ways for the principle investigator it was an action research experience, “an 
orientation to knowledge creation that arises in the context of practice, and requires 
researchers to work with practitioners” (Huang 2010:93). The highest ethical standards 
were maintained in terms of sensitivity of all information collected.
THE SPECIAL INvESTIGATIONS UNIT
The SIU was established in 2001 by virtue of Presidential Proclamation R118 of 2001 
(RSA, Proclamation R118, 2001) which repealed proclamation R72 of 1997 (RSA, 
Proclamation R72, 1997), that established the Heath Commission. It grew from a staff 
compliment in 2001 of sixty seven members, to currently more than five hundred 
(Walker 2013) and it has made contributions towards the investigation of fraud, cor-
ruption and maladministration within and against the public sector. Over the years, 
the agency has been able to facilitate prompt prosecutions through a multi-agency 
approach with the Scorpions/Hawks and National Prosecuting Authority, and made 
disciplinary recommendations against public servants suspected of having defrauded 
Volume 9 number 8 • September 2017 109
the public sector, as well as recover ill-begotten gains from identified fraudsters and 
corrupt public servants (Somiah 2016). The SIU has been without a permanent Head 
for considerable periods of time throughout the years and faced, on occasions, lack of 
adequate funding despite the existence of service level agreements that contributed to 
the agency’s budget. These situations had a negative effect on the SIU’s financial inde-
pendence and ability to investigate maladministration, fraud and corruption within and 
against government (Somiah 2016). Following the enactment of the Judicial Matters 
Amendment Act, the SIU’s financial capability has been enhanced significantly but 
not completely (Lubita 2016). There has also been criticism in regard to the SIU’s re-
liance on the President for the appointment of the Head of the Unit (Tamukamoyo 
2013:16–17; Schafer 2013).
A seminal study on anti-corruption agencies in South Africa (Pereira, Lehmann, Roth 
and Attisso 2012:9) pointed out several key issues. These include the significance of 
the Constitutional Court’s ruling in respect of the need for an independent anti-cor-
ruption body with structural and operational autonomy; the reality that South Africa’s 
comprehensive anti-corruption architecture composes of a range of important institu-
tions which address corruption from different angles; and that the rules and regulations 
are sometimes unclear and not transparent and therefore undermine the effectiveness 
of the anti-corruption architecture of South Africa and thus hinder the independence 
of the anti-corruption institutions. The report’s key recommendation was that ensuring 
the independence and impartiality of the institutions comprising the anti-corruption 
architecture of South Africa is an imperative.
It is important to note that the SIU is one of three agencies in South Africa that is 
tasked with an anti-corruption mandate. The other two are the Directorate for Priority 
Crime Investigation (DPCI) and the Public Protector. The mandate as anti-corruption 
units is derived from the respective pieces of enabling legislation i.e. the SIU Act, 
Public Protector Act and the SAPS Amendment Act, which empower all three agencies 
to investigate matters certain offences which are criminalised by the Prevention and 
Combatting of Corrupt Activities Act (PACOCA) Act (RSA, Special Investigating Unit 
Annual Report 2010–2011, 2011:7). The mandate of the SIU, as identified in Table 1, 
is executed by virtue of its founding and enabling legislation, the SIU Act as well from 
Presidential Proclamation that gives effect to the exercise of these powers.
Critically, the SIU cannot exercise its investigative powers in the absence of a 
Presidential Proclamation (Maharaj not in reference list 2016; Special Investigating Unit 
2016). The SIU operates with three core business divisions i.e. Business Management; 
Business Operations; and Business Support, that complement each other and fall un-
der the direct supervision of the Head and Deputy Head of the Unit (SIU Annual 
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Table 1:  Powers of South African Agencies that Investigate and Prosecute 
Corruption
Powers to... HAWKS SIU
Public 
Protector
NPA
Investigate X X X X
Search and Seizure X X X X
Arrest; X – – – 
Require from any person, particulars & information, X X X X
Subpoena any person to produce books, documents 
or objects
X X X X
Subpoena and question any person under oath or 
affirmation at one of its own proceedings 
– X X – 
To compel a person during its own proceedings, to 
answer any question which may expose him/her to a 
civil action/criminal charge (such evidence however 
may not be used in subsequent criminal proceedings
– X – – 
Institute and conduct civil proceedings in its own name 
or on behalf of a State institution in a Special Tribunal 
or any court of law
– X – – 
Prosecute – – – X
Attach assets through civil litigation – X – – 
Charge and recover fees from a State Institution for 
investigations/work done
– X – – 
Members qualified and admitted as advocates/ 
attorneys, may perform such work in a Special Tribunal 
or any court of law on behalf of the Unit or a State 
institution
– X – – 
Make systemic recommendations to state institutions – X X – 
Make recommendations for disciplinary action – X X – 
Make recommendations for civil action to the state 
attorney or to state institutions
– X – –
Develop policy, research, monitor and co-ordinate anti-
corruption efforts
– – – – 
Prevent corruption in power structures – – – – 
Educate and raise awareness – – – – 
Source: Adapted from the SAPS Act (1995), SIU Act (1996a), NPA Act (1998) and Public Protector Act (2004), Chetty (2016)
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Report 2012–2013 2013:7). It has a national presence in all nine provinces and each 
office comprises of a Regional Head and several project teams. Legal support is pres-
ent at all offices, while the Cyber and Data Forensics divisions are situated at the Unit’s 
Head Office in Pretoria. The Accounting CoE has limited capacity but is available in 
some of the Unit’s offices and are utilised as and when required. As deduced from 
Table 1 the SIU powers to investigate and prosecute corruption are wide-ranging and 
diversified as they encompass both investigative and civil litigation powers, where no 
other agency has the powers of litigation. The agency, however, lacks powers of arrest 
and prosecutorial powers.
With the exception of the Legal Centre of expertise and the Project Management 
Office, all other centres of expertise work with the project teams as and when re-
quired by the Programme and Project Managers. The Legal Centre of expertise and the 
Project Management Office provide support to the teams from inception until finalisa-
tion of a project. All respective centres of expertise are experts in their fields and can 
provide expert evidence and testimony in any court.
It has been widely acknowledged that over the years the SIU had a highly positive 
impact on the investigation of fraud, corruption and malfeasance in the public sector 
as is depicted in the annual performance report of the SIU’s Annual Report 2011–2012 
(2012:8–9). This becomes more evident in the comparative figures for the period 
2004/2005 to 2010/2011. The SIU Annual Report 2010–2011 (2011:10) presented the 
performance successes of the SIU from the period 2004/2005 to 2010/2011. It prepared 
evidence for 24 299 matters for criminal prosecution and evidence for 28 485 matters 
for disciplinary proceedings. In addition, the Unit prepared evidence for other remedial 
action totalling 563 536, which included recommendations for driver’s license cancel-
lations and removals from the Social Pension System (SIU Annual Report 2011:10). 
In this way the SIU assisted in cleaning up the department’s systems of fraudsters, 
and in so doing, improved the integrity of the respective department’s governance 
systems and processes. In addition it effected future savings of R 16 435m, considering 
all social grants recommended for removal from the Socpen system annualised over a 
10 year period at an agreed rate. Lastly, the actual value of acknowledgement of debts 
or civil litigation, as well as non-acknowledgement of debt recoveries, for example, 
admission of guilt was R332m (SIU Annual Report 2010–2011, 2011:10).
During the period 2009 to the end of 2014, there were R799m in potential cash recover-
able; R113.8m in actual value of cash/assets recovered; R111m in actual savings; R27.5m 
in value of contracts set aside; R1.3b in value of expenditure in procurement matters 
where financial misconduct was identified; 13 298 matters referred for criminal prosecu-
tion; and 10 591 matters referred for disciplinary action (SIU’s 2013–2014 Annual Report 
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(2014: iii). What is clearly evident from the above examples, is that the SIU with both its 
investigation and litigation powers is an important force in the anti-corruption domain, 
and is considered a key player amongst South Africa’s law enforcement agencies and 
anti-corruption efforts to curb the scourge of corruption in the country. This is the case 
despite the fact that it is an investigation unit whose primary responsibility is law enforce-
ment and adopts an investigative model that does not embark on full-blown prevention 
or even public education exercises (Somiah 2016). It has its own enabling legislation, 
the SIU Act, which empowers it with all but the powers of arrest and detention, and 
contributes through close collaboration, and cooperation with the DPCI and the Asset 
Forfeiture Unit to complement its lack of powers to arrest, seize and forfeit property. It 
lacks in solid budgetary support or financing unlike for example the renowned ICAC 
(Independent Commission Against Corruption) agency of Hong Kong which has been 
extremely well financed by government annually (Heilbrunn 2006:137).
The SIU does not have prevention and community relations departments, but rather 
Business Management and Business Support, like the ICAC. The ICAC’s Corruption 
Prevention Department funds corruption-related studies, conducts seminars and assists 
both public and businesses to find corruption-prevention strategies. It’s Community 
Relations Department “builds awareness on the societal costs of corruption” with 
business and the community (Heilbrunn 2006:137). The SIU has no such focus and 
has not endeavoured into awareness building programs like the United Nations body, 
the United Nations Convention Against Corruption UNCAC’s (2004:10), on the other 
hand, is guided by article 6 of their Act, where State Parties are required to “ensure the 
existence of a body or bodies” that prevent corruption by implementing anti-corrup-
tion policies; and “increasing and disseminating knowledge about the prevention of 
corruption”. There is thus a gap in the role of the South African SIU, which in line with 
UNCAC’s guidelines and provisions, suggests that the SIU should reconsider its roles 
and responsibilities in this regard. This will ensure that South Africa is in line with its 
international obligations in terms of its UNCAC ratification.
The SIU like the ICAC, maintains a strong degree of integrity with its members and 
operations, so much so that it has its own Internal Integrity Unit (IIU) set up within 
the confines of its Business Management division (Somiah 2016). This division ensures 
that the SIU recruits and maintains staff of the highest calibre by subjecting them to 
stringent annual vetting processes. In relation to reporting of corruption to the ICAC by 
citizens, while the ICAC according to Heilbrunn (2004:3), is able to freely investigate 
any allegations of corruption with specific police powers to investigate and prevent 
corruption, the SIU cannot investigate as freely as its mandate or terms of reference 
emanates only from Presidential Proclamations, without which the Unit may not exer-
cise its powers (Maharaj 2016).
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While the ICAC appears to have generated a reputation for combating corruption, the 
SIU too has, thus far, been very successful in the execution of its mandate with mini-
mum criticism and maximum praise as reflected in a parliamentary statement issued 
by Khubayi (2016), where the Parliamentary Committee on Telecommunications and 
Postal Services welcomed the SIU’s progress made on the investigation into tender 
irregularities, irregular appointments, theft, fraud and corruption. Parliament felt reas-
sured that investigations were progressing swiftly, and that matters had been referred to 
the National Prosecuting Authority, while the Asset Forfeiture Unit and civil processes 
were underway. In fact what is significant in this regard, is Parliament’s support of the 
set-up of a Special Tribunal which can be convened to deal with any civil litigation 
matter brought before it by a Special Investigating Unit, thereby enhancing the Unit’s 
ability to promptly deal with, and dispose of its matters through a dedicated court.
THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE
The key legislation under which anti-corruption agencies operate in India are the Central 
Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 (also known as the CVC Act), the Delhi Special Police 
Establishment Act, 1946 (the DSPE Act,) and the Lokpal and Lokayukta Act (LLA). The 
CVC is an important anti-corruption agency in the country, as it is instrumental in moni-
toring all reporting, all vigilant activity in the country, and advising on the execution of 
vigilance work pertaining to the Central Government. The CVC is legally empowered to 
inquire into all offences to be found in the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (the PCA) 
(Social Issues India 2011:4). All CVC proceedings are legally-bound judicial proceedings, 
and the organisation has all powers and proceedings of a criminal and/or civil court.
The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), which is in many ways the equivalent of 
the SIU in South Africa, is founded upon the dictates of the DSPE Act, and has a 
specialised section, the Anti-Corruption Division, whose main responsibilities include, 
investigation of a wide variety of corruption cases, fraud, bribery, gratifications, and 
all other types of organisational and departmental irregularities committed by public 
servants operating under the auspices of the Central Government and the wider public 
service (CBI 2014:6). The Division of Economic Offences was added in their investiga-
tive responsibilities with speciality on fiscal laws, while the Division has been dealing 
with food offences, such as black marketing, corruption, bribing smuggling and profi-
teering. The last two were later amalgamated into the Economic Offences Wing.
The initial successes and expansion of the unit’s activities led to the creation of the 
anti-corruption and special crimes divisions, as well as the economic crimes section. 
Finally, the Special Crimes Division was responsible for handling terrorism cases, bomb 
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blasts, homicides, kidnapping, and organised crime (CBI 2010:3–4). The CBI, thus, has 
a wide range of powers dictated by the DSPE Act, which also outlines the wide array 
of duties, responsibilities, liabilities and privileges of the officials who investigate the 
offences. It is considered to be the most important anti-corruption investigative author-
ity operating under the auspices of the Central Government, and especially under the 
Ministry of Personnel, Pensions & Grievances. It is important to note that no investiga-
tion can commence at any state levels without the permission of the relevant central 
state entity. However, the High Courts and the Supreme Court can instruct the CBI to 
conduct investigations (Asian Intelligence 2016:2).
Given the fact that the Prevention of Corruption Act is India’s key legislation against corrup-
tion, the unit’s main objective is to fight against public administrators’ attraction to solicita-
tion of bribes, gratification and fraud while on duty. On the other hand, it also investigates 
the role and actions of ‘mediators’, intermediaries in their actions. Prosecution under the 
Act, however, cannot take place without the permission of the ‘higher authority in charge’. 
This, and the perpetual collusion amongst different executive branches relegate their suc-
cesses into obscurity, in most cases. (Quah 2009:814). It is understandably the busiest of 
all anti-corruption agencies as the legislation’s definition of a ‘public servant’ encompasses 
state, central and government-owned organisations and entities, elected officials, the 
whole spectrum of the public service and everyone who performs what has been called a 
“public duty”. Although, initially it was established as principally, and even exclusively, as 
an anti-corruption agency, at present its duties and responsibilities have been expanded to 
more diversified cases such as pure criminal act and terrorism.
For many years the upper middle and higher echelons of the unit were selected from 
state departments for a period of 5 years, but government leaders have the freedom 
to appoint, on occasions, new recruits at any time, without official or pre-determined 
official requirements. There are branches of the agency in all of India’s states (CBI 
2015:6), while simultaneously the country’s 28 states have their own anti-corruption 
branches comprising of police units whose investigating power is rooted in the Police 
Act (Quah 2011: 97; CBI 2015:4). It is interesting to note that, whistle-blowers are obli-
gated to report corruption cases, not to the CBI, but the Central Vigilance Commission, 
which has been declared the ‘designated agency’ for receiving complaints on alleged 
corruption. This designation also includes actions on the part of the CVC against those 
who leak names of whistle-blowers and witnesses. This is despite the fact that the CBI 
has a fully operational online whistle-blowing facility where alleged corruption cases 
and complaints can be recorded anonymously (Asian Intelligence 2016:2–3).
Despite these realities, the country has no clear legislation of regulatory mecha-
nisms protecting whistle-blowers. This means that the honest voice of potential 
Volume 9 number 8 • September 2017 115
whistle-blowers has been mostly silenced. This situation prevails despite the fact that 
the country is a signatory of the 2001 Anti-Corruption Plan of the ADB-OECD as 
well as the United Nations Convention against Corruption and the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. All these international conventions 
and agreements are clear that all signatories are obligated to update and formulate their 
legislative and regulatory frameworks in accordance with internationally-bound norms. 
This means that that the updating of anti-corruption legislation rules and regulations in 
regard to whistle-blower protection are obligatory to all signatories (Quah 2008:244).
The fight against corruption and a relatively strong boost for the CBI was related to the 
passing of the Right to Information Act (RTIA) of 2005, which has opened the gate for 
every citizen to seek information from any public service entity that is obligated by the 
law to respond within 30 days. The Act has introduced a measure dictating the measure 
that all public entities are obligated to have all data bases computerised and ready for 
public distribution when requested, and to provide easy access of the information to 
the wider public (Paul 2013:274–275). Civil society organisations, anti-corruption groups 
and individuals, as well as communities have utilised the facilities over the years.
Despite its self-proclaimed successes, the CBI has faced over the years a number of 
structural, functional and organisational hurdles that have all but stalled its previous 
historical successes. The issue of meagre remuneration of low and middle grade public 
officials in the agency stalls its contribution in the fight against corruption, because 
its own members use their positions to accept bribes, getting involved as ‘mediators’, 
especially when the possibilities for a successful prosecution are limited (Godbole 
2013:111). In a seminal diatribe on corruption in debt-ridden Greece, Passas (2015) 
succinctly stated that it is almost impossible to defeat corruption ‘when salaries are be-
low accepted living standards’ or when anti-corruption fighters operate on ‘an empty 
stomach’. In a key exposition of low civil service salary structures in South Asia, for the 
International Labour Organisation, Chew (1992) dissected monetary compensations in 
India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Bangladesh for a period between 1977 and 1987 
and indicated that such salaries were extremely low in comparative terms in respect 
of international standards. His clear position was that corruption, although unaccept-
able, became an inevitable response to poverty and degradation because of the low 
and continuously falling remuneration. Thus corruption had become perpetual, indeed 
incurable and inevitable (Chew 1992:2–3; 78; 101–102). The corruption in the agency 
can be explained as a version of a coping mechanism against poverty in the case of 
India and other countries throughout the world (Lindner 2013:2).
In an address to a National Conference on Fighting Crime related to Corruption, 
organised by the CBI in 2009, Chief Justice Balakrishnan (2009) pinpointed that the 
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extreme salary disparity amongst public servants as well as salaried staff in the private 
sector was a key to corruption and its expansion. In fact Quah ( 2011:465–466), who 
described the efforts to curbing corruption throughout Asia as an ‘impossible dream’, 
has pinpointed empirically that despite the fact that there have been some increases 
in public service workers salaries in India, they are in comparative terms significantly 
lower than those in Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore.
For the CBI or any other investigative anti-corruption agencies to be successful, it is 
imperative that its strategy and tactics become public knowledge amongst potential 
offenders so that the message is clear that the fight against corruption will succeed and 
corrupt public servants will be punished for their deeds and will be made to pay sub-
stantially for their actions (Karklins 2005:160–161). Given the meagre salaries and, on 
occasions, below par operational and systemic organisational challenges, the spectre 
of ‘insufficient policing’ as exemplified in the historically important work on control 
of bureaucratic corruption in Asia (Palmier 1985:279–281), becomes a reality that is 
instrumental in increasing corrupt practices.
Ahmad and Brookins (2004:29–30) have shown empirically and in comparative terms, 
that in a number of countries (Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and India) especially India, the 
existence of large numbers of corrupt acts committed by state officials go unpunished 
in most occasions, despite strong evidence against the culprits. Their evidence was 
based on a content analysis of hundreds of reports published in newspapers pub-
lished in Colombo, Mumbai and Dhaka on a wide variety of alleged corrupt actions 
of civil officials for a period of two months. In India, in the 119 cases reported in a 
Mumbai local newspaper, and one of the most widely read in the country (‘Times of 
India’ ), only 18 cases (15 per cent) had led to punitive action. On the same issue Quah 
(2011:90–91), has shown that the detection, investigation and punishment probabilities 
of corrupt officials in the public service in India is low.
The reality is that, unlike the SIU the CBI, is nothing more than a police agency as its 
key mandate emanates from the DSPE Act, that is based on the fundamentals of British 
colonialism as articulated by Quah (2007:13–16; Quah 2011:251–252). The CBI faces 
a number of problems because of the multiplicity of its functions, which its mandate 
dictates to perform both anti-corruption and non-corruption-related functions, which ex-
pand to both economic and other ‘special crimes’, such as terrorism, criminal syndicates 
and a wide variety of organised crime operations. One of the most important setbacks 
that the unit has faced over the years is the personnel inadequacies and state lack of 
funding of its operations throughout the country. CBI’s annual reports (CBI 2005:29; 
2006:38; 2008:45; 2010:56; 2011:41; 2012:62; 2015:84) have shown conclusively that 
its numbers have decreased in real terms from 2013 to 2015. This has been the result 
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of the unit’s inability to fill existing positions as the figures indicate that vacant positions 
range from 12.1% in 2009 to 1 379 (21.1 per cent) in 2010. Hence the CBI has been 
characterised as an extremely small organisation trying to solve tens of thousands of 
corrupt acts (Lall 2007:230–231). The reality is that the CBI cannot investigate corruption 
cases at the state level because of constitutional stipulations that dictate that law and 
order come under the jurisdiction of the states (Narasimhan 1997:255).
Additionally, the decline in power of the Congress Party, resulted in a number of state 
governments to withdraw the consent given by their predecessors, as they feared po-
litical embarrassment and vilification. Hence, such fears of political embarrassment, 
caused by corruption left the CBI at the mercy of politicians fearing for their future. 
This destabilised the CBI and its leadership because their actions depended on the 
politicians’ mercy (Luce 2013:83). Perhaps the most important weakness and limita-
tion of the CBI is its lack of independence. Because of the legislative and regulatory 
operational and policy framework, the agency has to serve a wide variety of ‘masters’ 
in the field: the Home Affairs Ministry, that is responsible for the Director’s appoint-
ment, the Ministry of Personnel, Training and Public Grievances that is solely respon-
sible for the budget; the appointment process that is the responsibility of the Union 
Public Service Commission that appoints all officers above the rank of Superintendent 
of Police; the Ministry of Law and Justice, which is in charge of paying the salaries of 
those officers prosecuting corruption cases for the agency; and the CVC which is in 
charge of supervising its investigation of corruption cases (Tummala 2016:7).
CONCLUSIONS
Both India and South Africa face very serious challenges in their fight against corruption, 
a serious threat to their developmental goals. Key in these efforts are the anti-corruption 
institutions and agencies, the existing legislation and regulatory environment, and a 
number of characteristics upon which such agencies’ successes rely on. One of the key 
ingredients and basis for success is the independence of such agencies from political 
interference, and on this score the South African entity is in a better terrain when com-
pared to its Indian counterpart. In this, a more comprehensive legislative and regulatory 
framework in South Africa seems to be one of the key reasons for the difference. In 
effect, the anti-corruption mandate in South Africa can be described as stronger in com-
parison, although both face a number of similar problems mainly of a budgetary nature.
Both agencies find themselves more or less within an institutional anti-corruption 
framework that in a number of ways, suffers from a lack of coordination, overlap-
ping and conflicting mandates between institutions addressing corruption. In India, 
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key institutions often lack the staff and resources to fulfil their mandate adequately, 
and they struggle to protect themselves from political interference in the absence of 
preventive activities. A future research endeavour can pinpoint possibly the need for a 
number of legislative amendments which would not only serve to enhance the agen-
cies’ independence, but will improve their positioning in both countries.
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